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The GrExit Paradox
Nikitas-Spiros Koutsoukis1Spyros A. Roukanas2*
In this paper we consider whether the potential of Greece’s exit (GrExit) from the Eurozone has an impact on Greece’s economic
adjustment program and vice versa. In particular, we ask the question whether the “GrExit” d iscussion is leading into a Catch-22
situation: Greece is expected to default if it does not follow through with the economic adjustment program, when, at the same
time, the economic adjustment program appears to be an unsustainable strategy for revers ing the Greek economic downfall.
Our find ings are based on analyzing the literature regard ing (a) the possibility and consequences of a Greek exit from the
Eurozone, (b) the viab ility of the Greek economy given the adjustment program, and (c) the magnitude of the discussion
regarding Greece’s troubled economy before and during the crisis period.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Kavala Institute of Technology, Department of Accountancy, Greece.
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Greece entered its financial assistance mechanism on May 2nd, 2010. In essence, a trilateral financial support
mechanism backed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(European Commission, 2013). Although this outcome is a consequence of Greece’s poor financials it was triggered
by the 2007 global economic turmoil that originated in the USA. The interconnection of the banking sector globally,
brought forward the matter of high sovereign debt; in Greece but also in countries like Italy, Portugal and Spain. For
Greece, in particular, the2009 general government debt stood at 129.7% of GDP and general government deficit of
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15.6% of GDP (Eurostat, 2013a).This combination was the worst performance for all EU countries. The impact of
this was worsened by the Greek Government’s announcement [2009] that the general government deficit was
previously underestimated, and together with other factors it created the impression of an unreliable country (and EU
partner) and was indicative of the depth of the Greek problem (e.g. Koutsoukiset al. 2012, Kouretas &Vlamis 2010).
Subsequently Greece’s access to the world lending market was progressively limited due to the high and rising
interest rates(Higgins and Klitgaard, 2011).
It should be noted that the macroeconomic view of the regional deficits is only part of the picture; the political
perspective is missing. And that is that the economic union lacks the political union, and thus the decision making
authority, required at the regional level, to implement an EU-wide fiscal and economic policy. Hence, beyond the
faults that can be attributed to the regional governments, as in the case of Greece, for not keeping up with the
Maastricht fiscal thresholds, the underlying root of the deficit problem is systemic at heart. There is no common EU-
fiscal and economic policy throughout the members states. Apart from the variability in the economies’ structures
there is also political variability in policy implementation.
This sequence of events initiated a discussion and debate among economists, institutions and other political and
EU analysts regarding the potential of a voluntary or enforced Greek exit from the Eurozone and the consequences
of such an approach for the country, its partners or both. In this paper we focus at the heart of this debate and
contrast the possibilities and consequences of a potential GrExit assuming the current strategy is unsustainable, and
how they relate to the arguments in favor of the current strategy to reverse the Greek economic downfall. Is any
single of these perspectives the cause of the other?
At the time of writing Greece is in its third year of it economic adjustment program, the main objective being to
reinforce Greece’s economic potential so that it may enter the world lending arena once more, as soon as possible.
At this time the key figures are a general government debt of 156.9% and a general government deficit of 10%
(Eurostat 2013a; Eurostat 2013b). Given these two indicators it appears that the financial reform has not yet created
the appropriate conditions for a substantial improvement of the Greek economy. We use these and other indicators
to analyze further the outcomes of the economic adjustment program and to evaluate its sustainability and contrast it
to the viability of the Greek economy. The period of our analysis is from 2002, the year of Greece’s entry to
Eurozone, until 2013 which is three years after the enforcement of the Adjustment Program to Greece.
We built our case around two major macroeconomic indicators: the government debt and general government
deficit. The reason for this is twofold: (a) most of the proponents and opponents for a Greek exit from the Eurozone
built their arguments around these two indicators, and (b) these indicators capture the aggregate outcome of fiscal
policies and any other reforms put in place to tackle the problem and meet the Maastricht criteria. Hence, in order to
show the contrasting views and the paradox, we feel, is prevalent in the GrExit debate, these indicators will suffice.
We acknowledge that an extended indicator list will probably make the contrast more insightful but the GrExit
paradox will remain.
The aim of this section is to analyze the economic consequences to Greek economy after leaving the Eurozone.
We will be using the same perspectives for both the Grexit and the viability of the Greek economy given the
adjustment program. This will allow us to have comparative observations for the main thesis of our article. Our
analysis is developed in three axes: (a) the implications to Greek banking system, (b) Greece’s access to
international markets and (c) the macroeconomic effects to its economy.
The Grexit will be followed by devaluation of national currency. The devaluation will create the condition for the
recovery of competitiveness of Greek economy and the reinforcement of Greek exports. According to Roger Bootle
and his team from Capital Economics the implications to the Greek bank deposits will diminish the purchasing
power of the Greek depositors especially for imports of goods and in case of exchanging any foreign currency
(Bootle, 2012). The recent decision of Eurogroupwhich is supported by all the Member States of the Eurozone
created new conditions at Eurozone.The Eurogroup decided for the contribution of uninsured depositors for the
rescue of Cypriot banking sector. This decision has limited the argument of loss of Greek deposits after a Grexit
(Eurogroup, 2013).
2. The consequencesof Grexit
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“ …Third, the evidence is that after previous large-scale devaluations and systemic economic crises, e.g.
the 1997 South-East Asian crisis and the Russian 1998 devaluation, the private sector has been able to
resolve these issueswithout thegovernment becoming heavily involved.” (Bootle, 2012, p.41).
Regarding the first perspective, a Greek exit from the Eurozone will be followed by a devaluation of its national
currency, thus creating the conditions for improving competitiveness and reinforcing exports. This will also reduce
the purchasing power of Greek depositors and will thus affect imports and foreign currency exchange (Bootle 2012).
For the second perspective, we consider Greece’s access to the international markets. Countries that have a
primary surplus are able to fund their expenditures through tax revenues. At the first quarter of 2013, Greece is
having a surplus of €0.97 billion, implying that, in the event of GrExit at this time, Greece will be able to sustain
public expenditure without external borrowing (Ministry of Finance, 2013). History shows that countries are able to
borrow at more competitive terms after a default, which is a rational [market] reaction. The assumption is that
countries will be able to repay a lower debt (Bootle 2012, p. 40). More specifically as Bootle argues:
Finally, we consider the macroeconomic effects of the GrExit. From May 2010 until now, economists and think
tanks have published documents regarding the implications of a Grexit to a number of macroeconomic indicators.
The most decisive for the evaluation of the course of Greek economy are GDP, GDP per capita, unemployment,
people at risk of poverty and real GDP growth rate. Thus we will use these indicators also for comparative analysis
in the next section of our article. The Grexit according to certain estimations will lead to a drop of up to 55% of the
nominal exchange rate (Bootle, 2012). The change of the exchange rate will have contradictory results to the
macroeconomic figures. The empowering of Greek competiveness will augment the exports but at the same time the
fall of the exchange rate will abridge the imports and the consumers will be directed to domestic goods (Papoulis,
2013). As a result of the rising demand for domestic products, there will be positive effects on employment, real
GDP growth rate and GDP. The GDP per capita will be lower in relation to imports but higher in relation to exports.
The macroeconomic indicator of people at risk of poverty will be counteracted by the rise in employment.
Although the GrExit discussion is not novel, it is becoming an epicenter once again, because two major shifts in
the Greek national economy. On one hand, after three years of the Adjustment Program the Ministry of Finance
announced that General Government of Greece has a primary surplus. So, Greece is now at a more powerful
negotiating position, and thus may be able to change radically the content and the intensity of the Adjustment
Program, which, until now, has been rather harsh and austere to the Greek people. On the other hand, the Adjustment
program has created a very negative situation for Greece; during this internal economy devaluation the Greek
economic performance is evidently worse than before 2010 and the economic adjustment.
We proceed to consider the viability (or not) of the Greek economy. In table 1 we analyze the evolution of
deposits and repos at the Greek banking system of domestic enterprises and households. For the period under study
we can see that just four months before the financial support of Greece, at December 2009, the deposits were at the
highest level since Greece’s entry to the Eurozone. From December 2009 until June 2012 deposits had a negative
course. According to the latest available data of December 2012 the deposits showed a tendency to increase, but
there difference is still very large in relation to the deposits before the Greek debt crisis.
Table 1. Analysis of Deposits and repos at Greek Banking System of Domestic enterprises and households (Millions of
euros)
December 2002 124.240
Eurozone entry
June 2003 121.785
December 2003 126.752
June 2004 130.032
3. The viabil ity of the Greek Economy
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December 2004 137.532
June 2005 146.603
December 2005 159.581
June 2006 166.705
December 2006 174.937
June 2007 185.476
December 2007 197.929
June 2008 209.707
December 2008 227.620
June 2009 237.518
December 2009 237.531
June 2010 216.874
Adjustment program
December 2010 209.604
June 2011 188.179
December 2011 174.227
June 2012 150.587
December 2012 161.451 Currently
Adapted from: (Bank of Greece, 2013)
In table 2 we consider a count of news media articles with reference to the Greek politico-economic
developments at the start of the crisis. The data shows that agreement between Greece and European Commission
for the financial support augmented the interest of world newspapers for the prospect for Greek Economy. After the
agreement for the Adjustment Program the interest of the world newspapers was diminished.
Table 2. Number of articles with reference to Greek politico-economic developments*
September 2009 20
Greek Crisis unfolds
October 2009 34
November 2009 26
December 2009 165
January 2010 140
February 2010 461
Greek Crisis peaks due to high lending ratesMarch 2010 426
April 2010 451
May 2010 856 Adjustment program commences
June 2010 335
Adjustment program period
July 2010 210
August 2010 121
September 2010 131
October 2010 140
*It includes articles in the newspapers: GazetaWyborcza, Daily China, Die Zeit, El Pais, Le Figaro, The Daily
Yomiuri, The India Times, The New York Times, The Korea Times, The Straits Times, The Times.
Adapted from: (Antoniades, 2012)
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In table 3, we present the role of rating agencies to the evaluation of Greek economy. It is important to note that
rating agencies affect national economies because they have the ability to influence the markets. However, we are
not blaming the rating agencies for the negative course of the Greek economy as they are evaluating ‘economic
fundamentals.’ We agree with the view that the economic fundamentals created the preconditions for negative
evaluation(s) of the Greek economy by the rating agencies and not the opposite (Kotios 2012).
Table 3. Evaluation from Rating Agencies
Foreign currency rating Local currency rating
Date Long-term Short-term Outlook/Watch Long-term Outlook/Watch Country
Ceiling
23 Oct 2002 A F1 Positive A Positive -
20 Oct 2003 A+ F1 Stable A+ Stable -
28 Sep 2004 A+ F1 Rating Watch
Negative
A+ Rating Watch
Negative
-
16 Dec 2004 A F1 Stable A Stable AAA
5 Mar 2007 A F1 Positive A Positive AAA
20 Oct 2008 A F1 Stable A Stable AAA
12 May 2009 A F1 Negative A Negative AAA
22 Oct 2009 A- F1 Negative A- Negative AAA
8 Dec 2009 BBB+ F2 Negative BBB+ Negative AAA
9 Apr 2010 BBB- F2 Negative BBB- Negative AAA
21 Dec 2010 BBB- F2 Rating Watch
Negative
BBB- Rating Watch
Negative
AAA
13 Jul 2011 CCC C - CCC - AAA
22 Feb 2012 C - C C - AAA
13 Mar 2012 B- B Stable B- Stable AAA
17 May 2012 CCC C - CCC - B-
Source: (FitchRatings, 2013)
As we can see from table 3 the rating for Greece from Fitch Rating was stable from the entrance of Greece to
Eurozone until October 2009 when Greece elected a new government (Ministry of Interior, 2013). The election came
about as a result of the former Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis, at September of 2009 who stated that
Greece was going to elections because the citizens had to decide about the course of the Greek Economy. According
to Mr. Karamanlis the consequences of the international economic crisis were becoming visible to the Greek
Economy (Ethnos, 2009). And so the rating agencies had a different reaction to the Greek elections, in relation to the
reaction of world newspapers that we saw above ( see Table 2, Sep-Nov 2009). It appears that the rating agencies
relied mostly on the former prime ministers concern in order to procure their ratings at the time – thus the political
rather than the economical aspect. This is further supported by the fact that Greek economic fundamentals were
poor if not negative for many years before its government publicly acknowledged it as a fact. Since then, and for the
period from October 2009 to May 2012, the data available shows that the world markets do not take into
consideration the outcomes of the Greek Adjustment program as decisive for the improvement of rating of Greek
Economy.
Table 4. Foreign Direct Investments of Greece (Million US dollars)
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4 047 5 247 2 413 2 055 978 1 790
5 358 2 112 4 490 2 435 373 1 825
Source: (OECD, 2013)
In table 4 we present the outflows and inflows of foreign direct investments in Greece. The data show that 2010
was a year with negative process for FDI inflows and outflows in relation to 2009. The uncertainty for the Greek
economy limited the activation of investors at Greece. At 2011 the situation changed; Greece surpassed uncertainty
and the inflows and outflows of FDI had a positive trend.
Table 5. Macroeconomic analysis of staying Greece at Eurozone
90 10.3 - -
172431.8 93 9.7 - 5.9
185265.7 94 10.5 30.9 4.4
193049.7 91 9.9 29.4 2.3
208622.3 92 8.9 29.3 5.5
223160.1 90 8.3 28.3 3.5
233197.7 93 7.7 28.1 -0.2
231081.2 94 9.5 27.6 -3.1
222151.5 87 12.6 27.7 -4.9
208531.7 79 17.7 31.0 -7.1
193749.0 - 24.3 - -6.4
- 27.2 (M01) - -
Source: (Eurostat, 2013)
Table 5 presents the macroeconomic effects of Adjustment Program to Greek Economy. Five indicators are
considered: GDP, GDP per capita, unemployment rate, poverty percentages, and real growth rate. The GDP is
following a declining trend mainly from 2010 until now. The GDP per capita presents a significant deviation from
the EU average, especially after 2010. The unemployment rate has increased substantially from 12.5% at 2010 to
27.2% in the first quarter of 2013. People at risk of poverty are also show an increasing trend from 2010 until now.
At the same time, the Greek economy is in dealing with a long-term recession; from 2008 until today the real GDP
growth rate is negative.
Taken altogether, the above discussion and analysis indicates that the process of creating general government
surplus and the goal reducing general government debt to a sustainable level have yet to be accomplished. The
achievement of economic growth is a process that needs positive steps to specific economic indicators. However, as
we have seen, the critical indicators are following the opposite course than those aimed at, by the Adjustment
Program.
In order to tie the reforms with the indicators and show a causal relationship an econometric analysis is more
appropriate. Our empirical view shows only the evolution of the indicators over the period in question. The point we
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Out flows of for eign di r ect i nvestment
Infl ows of for eign di r ect i nvestment
GDP at mar ket
pr i ces (M i l l ions of
euro)
GDP per capi ta i n
PPS (EU-27=100)
Unemployment People at r isk of
Pover ty
Real GDP
grow th r ate
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
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are making is that, unfortunately, the GrExit discussion also takes place amidst a “promising” Adjustment program
and a worsening economy. This is the heart of the GrExit paradox.
In this paper we have considered some of the major changes that have taken place in the Greek economy after
three years in the economic Adjustment program. In the first section we considered some of the consequences of a
GrExit. We note that each consequence estimate exhibits a high degree of uncertainty; thus the discussion was based
mostly on historical experiences of other countries.
From one hand, we analyzed the GrExit consequences from a three-dimensional perspective: the implications to
the Greek banking system, Greece’s access to the international markets, and the macroeconomic effects to the Greek
economy. On the first dimension it is obvious that adopting a new national currency will diminish imports because
of the loss of the purchasing power of the Greek depositors. The argument of the loss of the deposits limited its
power because of the decision of Eurogroup for contribution of uninsured depositors for the rescue of Cypriot
banking sector. ? ccess to the international markets is not an imperative target especially now that there is a General
Government primary surplus. Even so and according to historical economic experience it will be easier for Greece to
borrow from the world markets. Finally, the macroeconomic analysis shows the relevant macroeconomic indicators
will have a positive path following a GrExit.
Of course one should consider this discussion from an external perspective as well, i.e. from what was going on
outside the Greek economy. In this context the lack of an EU-wide political union is a systemic fault that has
allowed nearly all the EU economies to stray, more or less, from the Maastricht criteria – not only Greece. This is an
important flaw which allows Greece and other weak economies of the Eurozone to become highly vulnerable to the
markets and subsequently their international positioning until the EU institutions become aware to the problem(s)
and react accordingly. In Greece, for example, the bonds yield spreads increased 10-fold within a year between 2009
and 2010, even if the adjustment program was put in place in the middle of this period; and as is well known Greece
has yet to recover. The effects of this incident sequence on the political life and the society of Greece are profound,
but this is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss further.
On the other hand, viability study for the Greek economy denotes mostly negative prospects. The Greek banking
system is facing the reduction of the deposits after the adoption of the Adjustment Program. Furthermore, the
evaluation from Rating Agencies, after the debt crisis show us that Greece continues to follow a negative
[macroeconomic] course. This, in addition to the FDI figures suggests that the Greek economy is deteriorating
rapidly in every economic fundamentals that could prevent a Greek economic downfall.
The collection of arguments in our analyses above, the attainment of a primary surplus for the first quarter of
2013 and the irreversible development of the economic fundamentals reenacts the dialogue of a GrExit and
reestablishes Greece’s negotiating position in this dialogue as well as the continuation of the austerity program.
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